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Abstract 
Our study seeks to prove that German Stability Culture is a myth. The concept is a core legitimizing element of 
economic policy discourse in Germany and used regularly to juxtapose Germany and northern Europe and the 
euro area periphery. Using Eurobarometer surveys we construct a measurement for Stability Culture which is 
based on the priority assigned to the fight against inflation. Our empirical analysis covers the 2002 to 2010 
timespan and includes 27 European Union Member States. Our results show that the distinction between northern 
states with an allegedly strong and southern states with an allegedly weak Stability Culture is a myth. Controlling 
for actual inflation, we find that the northern Member States with an allegedly high Stability Culture are less 
concerned with price stability than the rest of the EU.  
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1. Introduction 
The concept of Stability Culture has been manipulated both as a diagnosis of and 
remedy to the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. Stability Culture refers to a common 
policy perspective the primary concern of which is price stability. The Sovereign 
Debt Crisis, so the argument propagated by Stability Culture champions goes, was 
brought on by a failure to establish a firm German-style Stability Culture across the 
Eurozone. In the words of the former Bundesbank president Helmut Schlesinger1 
(2012), the crisis can be identified as a problem of ‘different mentalities’ and the 
omission in the Maastricht Treaty of a requirement that ‘all Member States have the 
same Stability Culture’. This diagnostic is echoed by the demand of the AfD 
(Alternative for Germany, 2014) – an anti-euro party established in 2013 which 
achieved almost 5 percent of the vote in the national parliamentary election of the 
same year – for an ‘ordered break-up of the current Eurozone and the establishment 
of stable currency unions of countries with a similar Stability Culture’. The German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s official cure to the Sovereign Debt Crisis strikes a 
similar, though non-secessionist, note. In May 2010 she declared herself guardian of 
the Stability Culture: ‘I will take care that we make sure together with our partners 
                                                 
1 Schlesinger is thought to have coined the term Stability Culture: ‘Sound money needs not only a stability oriented 
policy by central bankers and the government [...] it needs a Stability Culture in the public and in politics’ (Börsen-
Zeitung, 1 February 1992). 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2015/34 
Europa Working Paper No 2015/06 
 
 2 
that the whole of Europe commits herself to a new Stability Culture’ (Merkel 2010a).  
In so doing, cultural atonement was considered a priority: ‘My focus will be for us 
to make clear that the Stability Culture has to improve’ (Merkel 2010b). Merkel’s 
project of a pan-European Stability Culture, a distinctly German project, does little 
to shroud the fact that Stability Culture discourse is inherently discriminatory and 
divisive. It pits allegedly ‘good’ Stability Culture countries (such as Germany, 
Finland, Austria and the Netherlands)2 against allegedly ‘bad’ countries lacking a 
Stability Culture (such as Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy). 
 
It would be precipitous to dismiss the discourse on Stability Culture as political 
window-dressing (although it has elements of this). The promotion of Stability 
Culture by German politicians has far-reaching policy implications, notably 
regarding the prescription of fiscal consolidation for the sake of price stability. 
Despite its role in guiding policy responses to the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, 
its axiom of cultural superiority / inferiority has not been subject to a comprehensive 
investigation. Beyond scarce evidence presented from summary statistics (Collins 
and Gavanzzi 1992; Hayo 1998), a systematic analysis of the variation of Stability 
Culture in the European Union (EU) is still wanting. Our analysis seeks to address 
this empirical blind spot. This article will proceed as follows: First, we explore the 
history and politics of Stability Culture. The subsequent section discusses our 
measurement of inflation aversion, model specifications and data. We then present 
the empirical results and robustness tests and discuss our main findings. Using 
                                                 
2 Hans Olaf Henkel, the former head of the Federation of German Industries (BDI), suggested thus that the solution 
to the Debt Crisis is to be found in Germany, Finland, Austria and the Netherlands exiting the common currency 
and creating their own monetary union (Financial Times 29.8.2011). 
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Eurobarometer surveys we demonstrate that the population in the core countries of 
the alleged Stability Culture stronghold are less inflation averse than in the rest of 
the EU.  
 
2. The history and politics of Stability Culture 
 
We understand the term Stability Culture as a paradigm of price stability shared by 
politicians, central bankers and the population at large which is considered to 
constitute a vital framework for the market economy and the preservation of social 
peace (see Dyson 1998). ‘Stable money’, so the argument goes,  ‘is the foundational 
contract of democracy’ (Brüderle 2013).  In this study we focus on Stability Culture 
as political culture, and therefore on public opinion in the EU member states, not the 
views of political elites. Because this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study 
to systematically investigate Stability Culture across EU countries, the best starting 
point is the foundation of this political and socio-economic culture. At its core, 
Stability Culture is not an elite phenomenon. Rather it is firmly anchored within 
political and socio-economic culture. In its origins, this ‘culture of stability’ is 
considered by many to be a fundamental characteristic of German political culture 
(Mertes 1994: 6). Along similar lines, Richter (1991) understands Stability Culture 
as a ‘social concept’ anchored in the consciousness of the population. 
 
 Stability Culture has also been considered a key element of the success or failure of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (see Bofinger et al. 1998). German architects 
of EMU insisted that the Eurozone had to be founded on a durable ‘stability-
orientation’ (dauerhafte Stabilitätsorientierung) (Dyson 2015). This ordo-liberal 
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blueprint for monetary integration goes beyond political elites. Hayo (1998) claims 
that the design of the European Central Bank (ECB) is merely one part of a stability 
regime that must be reinforced with public attitudes in favour of price stability. 
Public opinion is thus said to become a ‘significant precondition’ of the success and 
longevity of EMU (ibid. 244). 
 
The focus of this contribution on actual inflation aversion of individuals also 
functions as a much needed reality check. The widespread German discourse on 
Stability Culture in the context of the ongoing Eurozone crisis, does not stop at the 
(in)capacities of various national political elites, but also involves sweeping 
statements about national populations at large. Three well-known examples of this 
sweeping discourse include: the portrait of ‘lazy Southerners’ and ‘efficient 
Northerners’ in former Bundesbank Executive Board member Thilo Sarrazin’s 2012 
bestseller Europe doesn’t need the euro (2015); the campaign mounted by the 
German newspaper Bild against ‘billions for greedy Greeks’; and Chancellor 
Merkel’s portrait of ‘southern Europeans’ as work-shy and too fond of holidays and 
early retirement (EU Observer 19 May 2011). The concept of Stability Culture is not 
confined to Germany’s borders -- see, for example, the views of Sweden’s Minister 
of Finance, Anders Borg (Scocco 2015 -- but the portrait of Germans as inflation 
averse is particularly widespread (e.g. Rehn 2012; La Tribune 22.01.2015; Financial 
Times 14.8.2013, the Economist 15.11.2013). 
 
The policy prescriptions of Stability Culture entail a mantra of fiscal restraint with 
the aim of achieving price stability. One of the alleged by-products of a Keynesian 
approach to demand management is higher inflation. Cottarelli et al. (1998), for 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2015/34 
Europa Working Paper No 2015/06 
 
 5 
instance, argue both deficit and debt levels have a significant effect on inflation. Yet, 
a positive deficit/debt-inflation correlation has been challenged by a number of 
scholars, who see at best a tentative link. Catao and Terrones (2005), for example, 
argue that the relationship does not apply to low-inflation advanced economies. We 
argue that the economic accuracy of this alleged transition mechanism is only 
secondary for our analysis:  at the heart of the construction of the pan-European 
Stability Culture is the claim that high deficits cause inflation (cf. EMI 1996). This 
assertion was repeated with the reformed Stability and Growth Pact3 (Gonzalez-
Paramo 2005), in the aftermath of the 2008/2009 recession (Stark 2010), and in the 
context of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis (Bundesbank 2013). Indeed the 
German debate on (monetary policy) responses to the Eurozone crisis is framed by 
the concern over rising inflation, from eurobonds to the ECB’s quantitative easing 
bond-buying — referred to by the most-read German newspaper as ‘the ECB 
tsunami’ (Bild 2.2.2015). In the on-going debate on the speed and scope of budgetary 
consolidation efforts, the link between fiscal profligacy and rising inflation has been 
presented as justification for fiscal consolidation. In a Financial Times opinion-
piece, for example, the German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble stressed the 
need for ‘expansionary fiscal consolidation’, stressing that Germany was ‘more 
preoccupied with the implications of excessive deficits and the dangers of high 
inflation’ (Schäuble 2010).  
 
                                                 
3 The Stability and Growth Pact sets budgetary rules which apply to all EU Member States. Specifically, in both 
its original and reformed versions, it stipulates a deficit to GDP threshold of 3 per cent and a debt level threshold 
of 60 per cent of GDP.  
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Schäuble’s justification for Germany’s alleged preoccupation with inflation is in line 
with the founding myth of Stability Culture, dating back to the collective memory of 
the hardship and suffering the German population experienced during the hyper-
inflations of 1921-23 and the pent-up inflation of 1936-48. This experience resulted 
in people haunted by the spectre of ‘laundry baskets full of money’ (Billerbeck 2015) 
– ‘the fear of hyperinflation is printed in the German genome’ (Brüderle 2011). The 
link between Hitler’s rise to power and Germany’s inflation drama has been widely 
discredited (Blyth 2013: 59ff)4, notably as the years leading to the Third Reich were 
marked by recession which was linked with deflation and high unemployment. 
Singling out the German experience of runaway price-rises in the 1920s furthermore 
ignores that other countries share ‘memories of high inflation’ (Ehrmann and 
Tzamourani 2009). Comparing the German hyperinflation of the early 1920s to 64 
other periods of worldwide hyperinflation in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, 
it is evident that the experience of the Weimar Republic is hardly exceptional (Hanke 
and Krus 2012). And yet — in more recent years — the preoccupation with inflation 
of the German population and a significant section of its political class appears 
comparatively distinctive, exaggerated and, it might be argued, extreme (see 
Howarth and Rommerskirchen 2013). 
 
Given the strong presence of the term Stability Culture in European politics, it comes 
as a surprise that no study to date, as far as we are aware, has set out to test the 
                                                 
4 This link does however exist in another country: Greece. For an account of the Greek hyperinflation of 1944 and 
German occupation see Lazaretou (2005). 
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premise on which it rests. Are the populations of Southern European countries less 
inflation averse than the alleged model pupils of Stability Culture?  
 
3. Quantifying Stability Culture as inflation aversion 
 
At the heart of Stability Culture is a concern about price stability. As the preceding 
discussion suggests, the fear of inflation – inflation aversion – has thus been a central 
yardstick for a country’s Stability Culture. In a study on public support for the euro, 
Banducci et al. (2009: 573) argue that of all economic concepts, citizens do seem to 
have the greatest understanding of and knowledge about inﬂation – a claim based on 
a previous study by Walstad (1997). However, it is problematic to use a (by then) 
fifteen year old American survey as evidence for EU-wide knowledge about 
inflation. We should also note that the cited survey actually reveals that none of the 
questions pertaining to inflation is the most correctly answered. More recent 
evidence from EU countries is presented in a 2007 Eurobarometer survey 
(Eurobarometer 67.2) in which respondents were asked to indicate the actual 
inflation rate of their country. It seems that knowledge about inflation is 
characterised by a high degree of ignorance, with 51 per cent of the sample not being 
able to provide an estimate. Of those attempting an estimate, 93.85 per cent were 
wrong. In comparison, knowledge about the true unemployment rate was slightly 
better, with 8.48 per cent of respondents giving approximately correct answers. 
Interestingly, respondents in Greece displayed a greater knowledge about their 
country’s inflation rate (12.7 per cent had correct answers) than those in Germany 
(only 5.22 per cent had correct answers). This may be explained by the higher 
inflation rate in Greece (compared to Germany) in 2007 as well as historically higher 
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inflation rates – a relationship suggested by the coefficient of the correlation between 
the percentage of respondents guessing inflation wrong and the actual inflation rate 
in 2007 (n=27, r= -0.12).  
 
The discrepancy between actual and perceived inflation rates appears to be 
persistent. Issing (2006: 211) addresses the widespread misperception of price 
increases after the introduction of the single currency. There is evidence that the 
introduction of the euro reduced the ability of individuals to judge inflation correctly 
(Antonides 2008, Aucremanne et al. 2005).5 A further example would be inflation 
aversion during the Great Recession (the slump of 2009); the average inflation 
aversion in the Eurozone as well as the EU as a whole increased dramatically during 
the economic crisis and was highest in 2009 and 2010. Yet during the same period, 
‘price changes turned negative in a number of economies, sparking a debate on 
whether deﬂationary risks were likely to materialise and what steps would be needed 
to avoid deﬂation’ (Jeanne 2009). Draghi’s frustration (2014) with what he calls the 
‘perverse angst’ of inflation in Germany should be seen against the backdrop of a 
monetary policy community worrying about low inflation turning into outright 
deflation (Financial Times 24.1.2014). As this article is primarily concerned with 
explaining variant in inflation aversion, not knowledge about inflation per se, it does 
                                                 
5 The sample period of our empirical analysis covers only post-euro years. For our EU sample, the possible effect 
that Eurozone membership has on inflation knowledge will be controlled for with the ‘Euro’ dummy. We are 
therefore confident that the euro-effect does not systematically bias our estimation results.  
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not matter for our study whether or not individuals have a correct understanding of 
actual price developments – apparently, they have not.6 
 
Four main approaches to measuring inflation aversion can be found in the literature: 
 
1) Inflation aversion can be captured by the preferences about inflation of policy 
makers. Krause and Mendez (2005) and Heinemann et al. (2014) base their measurement 
on revealed preferences obtained from macroeconomic data. This policy maker centred 
measurement is then thought to reveal the emphasis policy makers place on inflation 
stabilisation. LeMay-Boucher and Rommerskirchen (2014) use ‘economic orthodoxy’ (a 
variable in the Comparative Manifesto Project) to measure governments’ commitment to 
low inflation as based on party programmes. Since the present study is concerned with 
the inflation culture of the population, not political elites, we shun away from using a 
similar measurement. 
2) Inflation aversion can also be modelled as the sensitivity of wellbeing to inflation. 
Di Tella et al. (2001) examine how respondents' reports of their wellbeing vary 
with national levels of unemployment and inflation. Collins and Giazanzzi (1992) 
adopt a similar approach but with two notable differences. First, they are interested 
how inflation and unemployment affect respondents’ assessment of their general 
economic condition, not of their happiness. Secondly, and more importantly, 
instead of using real inflation and unemployment rates, the respondents’ 
perceptions of changes in price levels and unemployment are taken as the 
                                                 
6 Note also that the measurement of inflation aversion used in this study has as an advantage that the respondents 
are not asked to make a highly quantitative judgment of price stability itself. 
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independent variables. A further ‘indirect way’ to measure inflation aversion is to 
analyse the relationship between a country’s inflation performance and the 
popularity of governments (cf. Hibbs 1982) or satisfaction with the practice of 
democracy (Clarke et al. 1993). Whilst all of these studies offer insight into the 
dynamics of a population’s attitudes towards inflation, they have the drawback of 
presenting an indirect measurement of inflation aversion. 
3) A third approach is to ask individuals survey questions specifically about inflation. 
Farvaque and Mihailov (2009) use the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2006 
survey of 33 countries concerning the role of government in society. Specifically, their 
measure of inflation aversion is based on the answer to the question whether respondents 
‘think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to keep prices under 
control’. Yet it is questionable whether the implicitly assumed inflation aversion and 
government responsibility are solidly linked. Respondents might be of the opinion that 
governments are in charge of keeping prices under control without being particularly 
inflation averse or worried about inflation. What is more, the formulation ‘under control’ 
is sufficiently vague for individuals with a high tolerance for inflation rates to give a 
positive answer. One can also distinguish between surveys that rank inflation against 
other economic issues and those that juxtapose inflation and non-economic issues. On 
the former, Scheve (2004) and Jayadev (2006) use the 1996 version of the ISSP survey. 
Inflation aversion is based on giving inflation priority when asked whether governments 
should fight unemployment or inflation. This indicator explicitly relates to the kind of 
Phillips curve mechanisms discussed below. Other studies use survey questions about the 
priority of the fight against inflation relative to non-economic values, specifically 
‘maintaining order in the nation’, ‘giving people more say in important government 
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decisions’ and ‘protecting freedom of speech’ (Hayo 1998, Ehrmann and Tzamourani 
2009, Ehrmann 2014).  
 
Our approach examines the priority assigned to controlling inflation in relation to 
both economic and non-economic goals. We base our analysis on Eurobarometer 
surveys where respondents are asked about the two policy priorities currently facing 
their country with inflation/maintaining price stability being one possible option. 
Specifically, various Eurobarometer surveys from 2002-2010 (cf. Appendix) include 
the question: ‘What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR 
COUNTRY) at the moment?’. Inflation aversion is assumed to be strong if ‘rising 
prices/inflation’ was among the issues named.7 Inflation as a policy concern thus 
competes directly with other economic and non-economic goals. Contemporary data 
that pits inflation explicitly against unemployment, similar to Scheve (2004), is 
unfortunately not available for our purposes given that we are interested, first, in the 
post-2001 period and, second, in tracking inflation aversion across all EU members 
over time.8 We should note that Scheve’s (2004) results do not relate to our main 
research question, as the underlying data does not allow for testing systematic 
differences between countries9.  
                                                 
7 The options were: Crime, public transport, economic situation, rising prices/inflation, taxation, unemployment, 
terrorism, defense/foreign affairs, housing, immigration, health care system, educational system, pensions, 
environment protect, others. Since 2007, ‘energy’ has been included as the penultimate option.  
8 However, one strength of our analysis in relation to others is that our measurement of inflation is based on one 
source only – Eurobarometer. Thus, our analysis avoid the problem of merging different data sets.  
9 Scheve’s panel is strongly unbalanced. For instance, survey results for Greece are only included for the year 
1997. A similar caveat applies to Ehrmann and Tzamourani (2012). 
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The absence of survey results on individual concerns about (rising) deficit/debt 
levels prevents us from analyzing the fiscal component of Stability Culture. Given 
that, as we argue above, Stability Culture emanates first and foremost from inflation 
aversion, this should not bias our analysis. At the same time, we welcome future 
research into the fiscal dimension of Stability Culture beyond single-country studies 
(e.g. Hayo and Neumeyer 2013; Heinemann and Henninghausen 2012). Further 
analysis (and new data) is also needed to investigate the preferences of political 
elites, capital and labour, and how these pertain to a country Stability Culture (cf. 
Posen 1993; Franzese 2001). New data would furthermore be needed to move 
beyond a binary understanding of inflation aversion, where individuals are either 
inflation averse (1) or not (0). What is more, we are likely to miss individual country 
and year specific factors, such as the emergence of pressing issues that may shift 
policy concerns. Since our measure of inflation aversion is based on the ranking of 
competing policy issues, a country-specific environmental catastrophe or foreign 
policy conflict may well appear to reduce inflation aversion. 
 
Our observations include 27 Member States, with the EU-15 being included since 
2002 and the new EU Member States since 2005. This leaves us with 197,742 
observations at the individual level and 176 observations at the country level. Table 
1 reports descriptive statistics of the inflation aversion measure by country between 
2002 and 2010, taking the mean inflation aversion (since 2005 for the new EU 
Member States). Some interesting observations suggest themselves. First, there are 
large differences in the average relative inflation aversion between countries, from a 
low of 3.1 per cent of respondents in Sweden to a high of 34.69 per cent of 
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respondents in Latvia. Second, it appears that German respondents (mean 17.30 per 
cent) are less inflation averse than Greek ones (mean 21.21 per cent), whereas there 
is little difference between the inflation aversion of Eurozone Member States (mean 
20.73 per cent) vs. non-Eurozone Member States (mean 19.67 per cent). Figure 1 
summarises the distribution of inflation aversion (2002-2010) with a box plot. For 
each country, the box contains the inter-quartile range (a measure of statistical 
dispersion) of inflation aversion, the medians are marked with dark lines, the 
whiskers indicate the range of the more extreme values and the dots mark any 
outliers. Overall, annual inflation aversion ranges from 1.27 per cent (Sweden in 
2005) to 70.93 (Latvia in 2008). Figure 1 highlights substantial variation across 
countries as well as within countries. Note however that only 4 per cent of the 
variation in inflation aversion is due to between-country variation. 
 
It is likely that the respondents’ inflation aversion will be influenced by rising prices. 
We compute the rank correlation coefficients between both variables for each of the 
27 countries. We rank the countries according to their mean inflation aversion 
between 2002 and 2010 and compare that ranking to the ranking according to their 
mean inflation rate in the same time period. We use the Spearman rank correlation 
to assess the correlation of these rankings. Based on this test (r = 0.57, n = 27) there 
seems to be a clear correlation between inflation aversion and actual inflation in the 
European Union. On the overall country level, the correlation between annual 
national inflation aversion and national inflation rates points to a similar relationship 
(r = 0.52, n = 194) as does, albeit less strongly so, the correlation coefficient on the 
individual level (r = 0.2, n = 192,755). Figure 2 further illustrates the link between 
inflation and inflation aversion. Yet as can be seen from Table 1, in some countries 
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the discrepancy between the real inflation context and the mean inflation aversion is 
quite stark. Taking the ranking of inflation aversion tells us about the context-
specific inflation aversion, but is of little use to determine the political economy 
determinants of inflation aversion beyond correlational findings. In order to 
investigate the dynamics of inflation aversion, it is desirable to control for the current 
economic context as well as for political and individual level factors. 
 
4. Data and Econometric Model 
 
To analyse the determinants of cross-country variation in public inflation aversion, 
we examine survey-based measures of inflation aversion in the 27 EU Member 
States between 2002 and 2010 as described above. The non-Eurozone EU countries 
serve as control group. This empirical analysis will be carried out on both the 
individual and the country level. A detailed description of all variables can be found 
in the Appendix. 
 
Dependent variables 
On the individual level, INFLATION AVERSION is a binary variable taking the 
value 1 if the respondent is inflation averse and 0 otherwise. On the country level 
INFLATION AVERSION takes the percentage of respondents of a country in a 
given year naming the fight against inflation as one of their country’s two main 
policy priorities. One of the strengths of our analysis is that it takes both individuals 
as well as whole countries as units of analysis. Public opinion studies are known 
often to yield disparate estimates depending on which unit of analysis is used. 
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Testing our hypothesis on both levels thus renders our results more robust and more 
readily comparable to studies using either model. 
 
Independent variables 
To control for the Stability Culture hypothesis, we construct country group dummies 
for the allegedly wayward states of EMU (SOUTH: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain, 
and Greece) as well as the alleged model pupils of Stability Culture (NORTH: 
Germany, Austria, Netherlands and Finland).10 We furthermore control for EMU 
membership to test whether monetary union has an impact on individuals’ inflation 
aversion. The variable EURO, taking the value 1 if a country is a member of the 
Eurozone / if the respondent lives in a country that is a member of the single currency 
union. If  joining the common currency area would indeed lead to a ‘stability culture 
across Europe’, as attested by the former German Finance Minister Theo Waigel 
(1997), the variable EURO should have a positive effect on inflation aversion. Low 
inflation is the official objective of the EMU project — with an inflation 
convergence criterion included in the Maastricht Treaty and the unqualified pursuit 
of low inflation established as the singular policy mandate of the ECB. In this line 
of argument, the convergence of popular inflation aversion is considered to underpin 
the political sustainability of EMU, as it ‘depends on the consolidation of the 
Member States into a political community based on shared beliefs’ (Sadeh 2009: 
545). Again, we argue that the consolidation of such ‘political community’ is not 
confined to political elites, but must encompass the population at large (see also 
Anderson 2006: 114-115). The assumption of EMU consensus on the importance of 
                                                 
10 Results remain the same with Ireland excluded and Luxembourg included in these groups respectively. 
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low inflation is compatible with both a ‘top-down’ process and a ‘bottom-up’ 
process of mass public opinion (cf. Risse-Kappen 1991). Public opinion was as much 
a factor in shaping EMU accession (e.g. Gabel 1998) as it was to be won over (e.g. 
Collignon and Schwarzer 2003). In both scenarios, the German narrative of Stability 
Culture would expect public opinion in Eurozone countries to place a higher priority 
in the ‘fight against inflation’.  
 
We further control for a host of factors at both the individual and the national level. 
At the individual level we include the controls AGE (age of respondent), 
UNEMPLOYED (unemployment status dummy), EDUCATION (years of 
education), and MALE (gender dummy). Based on the Barro-Gordon Model (Barro 
and Gordon 1983), numerous studies have suggested a trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment (e.g. Akerlof et al. 1996). Scheve (2004) finds that inflation 
aversion decreases with the rise in unemployment, arguing that this was broadly 
consistent with the specification of utility/loss functions in the literature (see also di 
Tella et al. 2001). Inflation has significant redistributive effects. In an attempt to 
group those disadvantaged and advantaged from inflationary policies – and therefore 
those more or less inflation averse – it is helpful to look at four key individual-level 
characteristics: age, employment status, education, and gender. First, ‘those on fixed 
incomes and limited political clout, such as pensioners or dole recipients, generally 
lose out’ (Burda and Wyplosz 2005: 417). Both groups are likely to be more sensitive 
to a decrease in the real value of money with unemployment benefits and pensions 
not being automatically inflation-adjusted (cf. Farvaque and Mihailov 2009). 
Women are in more volatile employment situations than men which may be why 
they tend to place less priority on curbing inflation than men (although see Bryan 
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and Venkatu 2001). Education should be considered a common indicator of ‘both 
labor market skills and cognitive abilities’ (Scheve 2004: 11). It is however not clear 
how education would play into inflation aversion (Jayadev 2006). On the one hand, 
less educated individuals may be more concerned about unemployment (vs. 
inflation). On the other hand, more educated individuals may find it easier to protect 
themselves against the costs of inflation, generating a negative relationship between 
education and inflation aversion. 
 
At the national level we control for the broader economic climate and include the 
variables INFLATION11  (the inflation rate), ΔGDP (the change in gross domestic 
product) and DEBT (national debt to GDP ratio). We include the debt to GDP ratio 
to control for the allegedly inflationary effects of (unsustainable) debt levels (e.g. 
Suzuki 1993). Governments, so the conventional wisdom goes, would push for 
inflationary policies to reduce their debt burdens. In monetary union the inflation-
                                                 
11  Empirical results strongly suggest that inflation expectations are the key ingredient of the 
inflationary process. Paloviita and Viren (2005) find that innovations in expectations account 
typically for more than one-third of the (forecast) variance of inflation. The main mechanism for this 
inflation expectations-inflation-loop is wages. When firms and employees negotiate wages and when 
companies set their prices, they regularly take their inflation expectations into account.  If inflation is 
expected to be high, employees might push for a higher wage increase, firms' costs increase, which 
in turn could be passed on to customers through higher prices. In short, inflation expectations can 
turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy; if people expect inflation, their behaviour can lead to inflation. To 
control for this we included various lags of inflation, which resulted in no substantial change of the 
results. It seems however that people’s inflation aversion is determined by their short-term perception 
of actual inflation as the magnitude of both coefficients declines with every lag introduced, as does 
its significance. 
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debt link is slightly different. Here, according to the popular concern, unsustainable 
debt burdens would oblige the ECB to act as a lender of last resort buying 
government bonds. This would increase the money stock and increase the risk of 
inflation. In both scenarios, outside or inside EMU, high debt levels are thought to 
indicate a bigger risk for inflationary policies and thus increase the inflation aversion 
of a population. The variable INFLATION controls for the assumed positive link 
between actual inflation and inflation aversion. The measures for unemployment and 
GDP growth further control for the economic climate which is likely to influence 
inflation aversion. 
 
Econometric model  
For the individual level model we use a logit regression appropriate for the binary 
nature of our dependent variable. Merging individual-level observations with 
country-level economic factors introduces the possibility that disturbances will be 
correlated across countries. Moulton (1990) shows that standard errors from a usual 
maximum likelihood estimation can be biased seriously downwards if the 
disturbances are correlated within the groupings that are used to merge individual-
level with country-level data. We therefore cluster standard errors by country. This 
requires the weaker assumption that errors are independent across countries but not 
necessarily across survey respondents within a given country. Unit root tests suggest 
that the series in all models is stationary. 
 
In order to explore the determinants of inflation aversion at the country level we use 
random effects. Fixed-effects estimations may be better suited in time-series cross-
sectional data with a time series of T→30 (Judson and Owen 1999) — our panel 
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covers only 10 years at most (less for new EU Member States). To test formally 
which model is more appropriate for the data analysis, we conducted the Hausman 
test — both for the full EU and for the Eurozone panel — which is usually applied 
in the literature (Hsiao 1986). The Hausman test examines the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients estimated by the random-effects estimator are not systematically 
different from the ones estimated by the fixed-effects estimator. Results suggest that 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected  (Prob>χ2=0.217 for the EU model and 
Prob>χ2=0.756 for the Eurozone model) and so we choose the random effects 
model, which gives efficient and consistent estimates of coefficients in our case. A 
further advantage of random effects models is that we are able to estimate time-
invariant dummies. The very core of our empirical analysis consists of testing the 
statistical significance of three variables that do not change, or change little, over 
time – namely NORTH, SOUTH and EURO.12 The confirmation of the use of a 
random effects model is in line with our intuition that inflation aversion is influenced 
by differences across countries. Our main model, where matrices I and E comprise 
individual and economic controls, is as follows: 
 
Inflation Aversion i,t  = β0 + β1NORTH i,t  + β2SOUTH i,t  + β3I i,t + β4E i,t  + ε i,t   
 
5. Empirical Results 
                                                 
12 The fixed-effects model controls for all time-invariant differences between the countries in the panel, so the 
estimated coefficients of the fixed-effects models cannot be biased because of omitted time-invariant 
characteristics. Time-invariant characteristics of a given country are collinear with the country dummies. 
Analysing the causes of inflation aversion across countries, a time-invariant characteristic, like belonging to the 
SOUTH cluster, cannot cause inflation aversion, because it is constant for each country. 
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The logit regression coefficient estimates of the individual level model are reported 
in Table 2 and random effects coefficient of the country level model are reported in 
Table 3. Our results strongly suggest that the distinction between northern states with 
an allegedly strong and southern states with an allegedly weak Stability Culture, as 
expressed in high and low inflation aversion, is a myth. In no specification is the 
SOUTH variable either individually or jointly significant. Conversely, the NORTH 
variable suggests that this country group puts less priority on the fight against 
inflation (between 6 and 10% depending on the model). 
 
The results of all models suggest that the economic context has a substantial impact 
on the public’s inflation aversion. As expected, the inflation rate has a strong and 
significant impact on inflation aversion (cf. Berlemann 2014; Ehrmann and 
Tzamourani 2012; Scheve 2004). We find that higher debt levels lead to an increase 
in inflation aversion, whereas GDP growth reduces inflation aversion (yet only for 
our country-level models). The negative and significant coefficient for the 
UNEMPLOYMENT variable for the Eurozone subsample in the Eurozone logit and 
both fixed effect models lends credence to the view that high unemployment rates 
lead to a decrease in inflation aversion. This is line with the existing literature. 
Scheve (2004), for instance, argues that as unemployment rises, reducing 
unemployment becomes a greater priority, achieving which makes rising inflation 
potentially more acceptable. However, we find that on the individual-level, being 
unemployed increases the probability of being inflation averse by 1%. Berlemann 
(2014) shows a similar mismatch between the sign of individual unemployment and 
national unemployment figures. Our results suggest that less educated individuals 
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are less inflation averse than more educated individuals which is in line with, inter 
alia, van Lelyveld (1999) and Easterly and Fischer (2001). For every year of 
education, the probability of being inflation averse is reduced by 1 percent. Contrary 
to Scheve (2004) and Jayadev (2006), we find that women are more concerned about 
price stability then men, which is in line with Berlemann (2014) and Ehrmann and 
Tzamourani (2012). However, surprisingly, and contrary to the existing literature, 
the AGE variable, while statistically significant, has a negative impact on inflation 
aversion. This result still holds when we split the variable into aggregate groups or 
include the squared term to model a non-linear relationship. Its marginal effect is 
small so age does not seem to be a main driver of inflation aversion. Our finding thus 
suggests that the ageing of national populations should not increase inflation 
aversion. Furthermore, this result is interesting as it contradicts the view that because 
inflation aversion is a function of a population’s experience with high inflation, 
popular inflation aversion should decrease with years of price stability (Ehrmann and 
Tzamourani 2009, although see van Lelyveld 1999). This is not the case: our data 
shows that across the EU, inflation aversion is fairly constant over the timespan of 
this analysis and reached a 9 year high during the Great Recession; and that the 
younger generation is slightly more likely to be inflation averse than the very old, 
many of whom lived through periods of high inflation. This finding runs counter to 
Ehrmann and Tzamourani’s concern (2009: 21) that the ‘mandate could possibly 
erode over time, due to the central banks’ own successes in taming inflation, thus 
lowering the sensitivity of the public towards rising prices’. 
 
The marginal effects of our logit model suggest that that inhabitants of the Eurozone 
are 11 per cent more likely to be inflation averse than inhabitants of EU Member 
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States that have not adopted the single currency. This result is confirmed by our 
country-level model. This in itself is not be sufficient evidence to claim convergence 
towards a policy consensus on the importance of price stability within the Eurozone 
as discussed in the literature. There are several other possible explanations of higher 
inflation aversion in the Eurozone. For instance an increase in inflation aversion may 
be linked to mistrust in the Central Bank in EMU Member States.13 To test this, we 
split our individual-level Eurozone sample into two groups: the first indicated that 
they do not trust or tend not to trust the ECB; the second noting trust for the central 
bank. If we split the whole EU sample according to trust in the ECB results are 
virtually identical. Our results, presented in Table 4, strongly suggest that the 
positive impact of Eurozone membership on inflation aversion is not due to mistrust 
in the Central Bank. When using the entire EU sample and including the variable 
EURO in both EU samples (split again according to trust of the ECB), the 
coefficients for EURO are statistically identical to those of the full model presented 
in Table 2. Results from these two sub-groups furthermore corroborate our main 
finding challenging the Stability Culture narrative. Respondents in the alleged 
stronghold of Stability Culture are less inflation averse than the rest of the Eurozone, 
whether or not they trust the ECB. 
 
6. Robustness tests 
                                                 
13 Trust in the ECB and inflation aversion could run both ways. On the one hand, trust in the central bank could 
relate positively to inflation aversion as respondents are more likely to fear for the value of the common currency 
if they do not trust the central bank in charge. On the other hand, a high degree of mistrust in the ECB may reflect 
scepticism towards the central bank’s singular mandate of price stability and therefore relate negatively to inflation 
aversion.  
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2015/34 
Europa Working Paper No 2015/06 
 
 23 
 
We furthermore test whether our model may be biased due to the inclusion of the 
period of the Great Recession (2008-2010).  Has the financial crisis changed the way 
in which our independent variables affect inflation aversion? We know from the 
literature that public opinion is not necessarily a constant function but may display 
non-linearities, especially in the event of political or economic crises (e.g. Bernhard 
and Leblang 2005, Ojeda 2014). We re-estimate our main models both at the country 
and at the individual level for the 2002-2007 period only. Results hold. Our finding 
is in line with other investigations into public opinion models on EMU related issues 
which include post 2008 data (cf. Wälti 2012, Roth et al. 2012). 
 
A further source of bias may stem from the construction of the variables NORTH 
and SOUTH. The selection of these country groups, although to a certain extent 
intuitive, may introduce the problem of simultaneous equation bias in our 
estimations. Specifically these countries were attributed group membership based on 
their allegedly low or high inflation aversion. This introduces the bias of reversed 
causality; inflation aversion explains group membership and not vice versa. To deal 
with the resulting potential endogeneity we use an instrumental variable approach 
(Baum et al. 2010). For this approach we need to identify instrumental variables. In 
our case, beer consumption per capita (BEER) and the number of olive plantations 
(OLIVE) are such instruments (see Appendix): they are strongly correlated with the 
country group dummies, but have no effect on individuals’ inflation aversion. For the 
main regression, the under-identification test (Kleibergen–Paap rk LM statistic) 
rejects the null hypothesis of under-identification on the 1 percent level –– the 
excluded instruments are relevant, as they are correlated with the endogenous 
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regressors. We then proceed to test for endogeneity in the variable estimated with 
instrumental variables; the results of this test show that the null cannot be rejected at 
the ten per cent level: endogeneity of the variables NORTH and SOUTH does not 
seem to be a problem in this analysis. We used the same instrumental variable 
approach to confirm that none of our included macroeconomic controls (inflation, 
change in GDP, unemployment, debt levels) are endogenous. Here we relied on 
lagged values as instruments and are able to confirm that endogeneity is not a 
problem for the variables in question. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The assertion of a common European ‘Stability Culture’ — that is, an economic 
policy perspective whose primary concern is price stability — was the ideational 
element of the German government’s official remedy to the Eurozone Sovereign 
Debt Crisis which erupted in 2009. This forms part of a deliberate communication 
strategy  by Christian Democrats in government that presented German Stability 
Culture as the source of the country’s economic success and a lack of said culture 
(as opposed to, for example, regulatory failure in the financial sector) as the main 
culprit for the Sovereign Debt Crisis. This narrative has pitted the allegedly prudent 
North against the profligate South. Our article challenges this crisis narrative 
presented by the Christian Democrats in German federal government and vocally 
supported by the ECB (e.g. Draghi 2012) and the European Commission (e.g. 
Barroso 2011). Using Eurobarometer survey data, our study systematically assesses 
inflation aversion in the 27 EU Member States. Our results strongly suggest that the 
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distinction between northern states with an allegedly strong and southern states with 
an allegedly weak Stability Culture – as expressed in high and low inflation aversion 
– is a myth.  
 
Offering cultural repentance as a remedy to the Eurozone’s current woes by 
promoting a uniquely ‘German Stability Culture [as] a common good of all the 
participating states’ (Merkel 2010b) is politically dishonest. Irrespective of the 
accuracy of its associated diagnosis and the efficacy of its associated treatment, the 
promotion of Stability Culture is likely to remain in European discourse. For German 
Christian Democrat politicians, the identification of solutions to the Eurozone’s woes 
in terms of fiscal austerity and price stability has been a useful shield against 
widespread criticisms of Germany’s massive current account surplus and export-led 
growth model. The insistent focus on Stability Culture has also been used to 
legitimize opposition to further European integration in the form of transfer union -
- and to dilute a range of mechanisms proposed to provide financial support to 
Eurozone periphery sovereigns and banks. The ECB and the European Commission 
are willing promoters of the concept of Stability Culture due to their strongly 
anchored, institutional responsibilities, and notably the ECB’s mandate of price 
stability and the surveillance of fiscal policies under the Stability and Growth Pact 
the first a replication of the German Bundesbank’s mandate; the second a pacifier 
for the German electorate anxious over the loss of the Deutsche Mark. The 
conclusions of the analysis presented in this paper encourage the adoption of a 
different discourse. Presenting the need to construct a common Stability Culture in 
the Eurozone as a panacea to the sovereign debt crisis is factually wrong and 
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politically lazy. This discourse also undermines the legitimacy of the EMU project 
— by reinforcing perceptions of difference and superiority — and, ultimately, 
endangers the sustainability of the single currency. 
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Appendix. Variable description and data source 
 
INFLATIONAVERSION: Variable is based on the question ‘What do you think are 
the two most  important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?’ 
(Options: Crime, public  transport, economic situation, rising prices/inflation, 
taxation, unemployment, terrorism,  defence/foreign affairs, housing, 
immigration, health care system, educational system,  pensions, environment 
protect, energy [added since 2007] others). For the logit models,  dummy 
variable, equal to 1 if inflation is mentioned, 0 otherwise; for the country-level model 
percentage of respondents in a country in a given year naming inflation. Source: 
 Eurobarometer 57.1, 57.2, 60.1, 61, 63.4, 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4. 
 
INFLATION: Based on the harmonised consumer price index (HCPI) , 2005 = 100. 
The HCPI  measures changes over time in the level of prices of goods and services, 
used and paid by  residents for consumption. The HICPs are designed for 
international comparison of consumer  price inflation. INFLATION = ((HCPI - 
l.HCPI)/l.HCPI)*100. Source: AMECO database. 
 
DEBT: General government debt as percentage of at market prices. Source: AMECO 
database. 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT: Unemployment rate, total (percentage of civilian labour 
force). Source:  AMECO database.  
 
ΔGDP: Gross domestic product, constant prices (percent change). Source: AMECO 
database 
 
EDUCATION: Ordered categorical variable with nine categories corresponding to 
increasing years  of formal education. Source: Eurobarometer 57.1, 57.2, 60.1, 61, 
63.4, 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3,  73.4. 
 
AGE: Exact age of respondent. Source: Eurobarometer 57.1, 57.2, 60.1, 61, 63.4, 
65.2, 67.2, 69.2,  71.3, 73.4. 
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MALE: Dummy variable, equal to 1 if respondent is male, and 0 otherwise. Source: 
Eurobarometer  57.1, 57.2, 60.1, 61, 63.4, 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4. 
 
UNEMPLOYED: Dummy variable, equal to 1 if respondent is unemployed or 
temporarily not  working, and 0 otherwise. Source: Eurobarometer 57.1, 57.2, 60.1, 
61, 63.4, 65.2, 67.2, 69.2,  71.3, 73.4. 
 
EURO: Dummy variable, equal to one if country is member of the eurozone; and 0 
otherwise. 
 
TRUSTECB: Variable based on the question: ‘Do you tend to trust or tend not to 
trust the European  Central Bank?’. For the logit models, dummy equal to 1 if 
answer ‘tend to trust’, 0  otherwise. Source: Eurobarometer 57.1, 57.2, 60.1, 61, 
63.4, 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4. 
 
SOUTH: Dummy equal to 1 for Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain; 0 
otherwise. 
 
NORTH: Dummy equal to 1 for Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Finland; 0 
otherwise. 
 
BEER: Annual beer consumption per capita. Source: Brewers of Europe. 
 
OLIVE: Olive plantations, number of farms per country. Source: Eurostat 
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TABLE 1. Inflation aversion and inflation, 2002-2010 
Country Mean 
Inflation 
Aversion 
Rank 
Inflation 
Aversion 
Rank 
Inflation  
Latvia 34.69 1 1 
Malta 32.01 2 14 
Lithuania 30.46 3 5 
Italy 29.256 4 18 
Romania 28.1856 5 3 
Estonia 27.82 6 6 
Bulgaria 27.42 7 2 
Slovenia 27.03 8 15 
Portugal 26.67 9 13 
Cyprus 26.66 10 16 
Hungary 25.22 11 4 
Austria 24.9 12 25 
France 21.87 13 24 
Luxembourg 21.36 14 11 
Ireland 21.3 15 17 
Poland 21.28 16 9 
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TABLE 1. Inflation aversion and inflation, 2002-2010 
Country Mean 
Inflation 
Aversion 
Rank 
Inflation 
Aversion 
Rank 
Inflation  
Greece 21.21 17 7 
Slovakia 21.16 18 8 
Belgium 19.83 19 21 
Czech 
Republic 
19.81 20 12 
Germany 17.3 21 27 
Spain 13.99 22 10 
Finland 12.35 23 26 
UK 7.82 24 20 
Netherlands 6.41 25 19 
Denmark 4.83 26 22 
Sweden 3.1 27 23 
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Table 2. Determinants of inflation aversion, individual-level 
Independent 
variables 
EU countries Eurozone countries 
SOUTH -0.27 
(0.19) 
 -0.20 
(0.16) 
 
NORTH -0.38 
(0.21) 
* -0.48 
(0.23) 
** 
INFLATION 0.23 
(0.03) 
*
*
* 
0.17 
(0.07) 
** 
DEBT 0.01 
(0.01) 
 0.01 
(0.01) 
 
UNEMPLOYM
ENT 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
 -0.08 
(0.03) 
** 
△GDP -0.01 
(0.01) 
 -0.03 
(0.02) 
 
EDUCATION -0.06 
(0.01) 
*
*
* 
-0.06 
(0.01) 
**
* 
MALE -0.13 
(0.02) 
*
*
* 
-0.13 
(0.02) 
**
* 
AGE -0.003 
(0.0008
) 
*
*
* 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
**
* 
UNEMPLOYED 0.09 
(0.03) 
*
*
* 
0.11 
(0.03) 
**
* 
EURO 0.71 
(0.22) 
*
*
* 
 **
* 
Constant -1.86 
(0.37) 
*
*
* 
-0.62 
(0.26) 
** 
Pseudo-R2 0.05  0.02  
Number of 
observations 
197,742  115,753  
Number of 
countries 
27  16  
Note: Logit regression. The standard errors are country-clustered robust standard errors.* p<.10, ** 
p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 3. Determinants of inflation aversion, country-level 
Independent 
variables 
EU countries Eurozone countries 
SOUTH -3.02 
(2.86) 
 -4.30 
(3.067) 
 
NORTH -6.71 
(3.66) 
* -9.97 
(4.48) 
** 
INFLATION 3.73 
(0.37) 
**
* 
3.26 
(1.05) 
**
* 
DEBT 0.05 
(0.32) 
* 0.08 
(0.04) 
* 
UNEMPLOY
MENT 
-0.63 
(0.34) 
* -1.14 
(0.43) 
**
* 
△GDP -0.65 
(0.21) 
**
* 
-1.10 
(0.33) 
**
* 
EURO 7.01 
(2.28) 
**
* 
  
Constant 11.48 
(5.16) 
 24.45 
(5.63) 
**
* 
R-Squared 0.35  0.26  
Number of 
observations 
206  120  
Number of 
countries 
27  16  
Note: Panel data estimator with random effects. The standard errors are country-clustered robust 
standard errors. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 4. Inflation aversion and trust in the ECB 
Independent 
variables 
TRUSTECB = 0 TRUSTECB = 1 
SOUTH -0.13 
(0.15) 
 -0.21 
(0.18) 
 
NORTH -0.53 
(0.19) 
*
*
* 
-0.43 
(0.21) 
** 
INFLATION 0.13 
(0.06) 
*
* 
0.28 
(0.08) 
**
* DEBT 0.01 
(0.01) 
 0.01 
(0.01) 
 
UNEMPLOYM
ENT 
-.10 
(0.03) 
*
*
* 
-0.07 
(0.03) 
** 
△GDP -0.02 
(0.02) 
 -0.04 
(0.02) 
* 
EDUCATION -0.06 
(0.01) 
*
*
* 
-0.05 
(0.01) 
**
* MALE -0.18 
(0.03) 
*
*
* 
-0.08 
(0.03) 
** 
AGE -0.01 
(0.01) 
 -0.004 
(0.001) 
**
* UNEMPLOYED 0.11 
(0.07) 
 0.10 
(0.34) 
* 
Constant -0.28 
(0.24) 
 -0.90 
(0.34) 
**
* Pseudo-R
2 0.03  0.03  
Number of 
observations 
31,562  52,761  
Number of 
countries 
27  16  
Note: Eurozone sub-sample, logit regression. The standard errors are country-clustered robust standard 
errors.* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
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